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I. INTRODUCTION
Established in 1935 to administer the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),1 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is an independent agency
entrusted with conducting union elections and investigating and remedying any
unfair labor practices by unions and employers. Once the NLRB’s Regional
Director issues a complaint of unfair labor practices, an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) holds a hearing that resembles a trial, where the NLRB’s General Counsel
prosecutes the complaint and the accused party defends its actions. During the
fact-finding phase, the parties can bolster their arguments with evidence,
witnesses, and experts.2
The ALJ’s initial decision is subject to review. Before the case may reach the
Court of Appeals and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, the parties must take the
case to the Board, an arm of the NLRB usually composed of five members
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In general, the Board
will adopt the ALJ’s factual findings. However, when considering a significant or
potentially precedential proceeding, the Board may supplement the record by
“invit[ing] briefs from any interested parties to gather an array of viewpoints and
experiences.” 3
In the 1930s, the Board’s original membership was almost exclusively
composed of nonpartisan government employees and academics.4 Further, the
NLRB’s employees included a Division of Economic Research (DER), a staff of
economists that developed policy analyses to assist the Board in deciding labor
disputes.5 By relying on social science statistics from both the economists from
the DER and an assortment of parties, agencies, and academics from outside the
division, this early Board enriched its understanding of complex labor questions,
established a practice of considering diverse perspectives, and acknowledged the
importance of rigorously assessing the socioeconomic impact of labor policy.
Over the years, the agency’s ability to evaluate data has eroded drastically. In
1939, a congressional committee confiscated the DER’s economic files and
branded the Board’s Chief Economist a Communist; in 1940, Congress summarily
banned the NLRB from employing economic experts.6 Since the 1950s, presidents

1. NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 33
(1997).
2. What We Do: Decide Cases, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do
/decide-cases (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
3. Id.
4. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1361, 1367 (2000). While the reader might conceptualize the DER as a board within a Board,
I will only refer to the NLRB’s appellate panel as the capital-B “Board.”
5. Robin Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor
Relations Board’s Division of Economic Research, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 341, 344 (1989).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals . . . for economic analysis”).
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have politicized the Board’s nomination process7 by proposing mostly attorneys
with connections to labor or management 8 and with virtually no social science
training or experience.9 Accordingly, the NLRB now employs neither economic
nor social science experts to research labor realities,10 and fails to enjoy
independent access to social science studies.11
Thus, in order to set the national labor policy, the Board is forced to rely on
appellate-level party and amicus case briefs for social science evidence.12 The
absence of scientific support undermines the accuracy and legitimacy of difficult
NLRB decisions. For example, in Dana Corp. (Dana II) 13 and several related cases,
the Board twice reversed its decision on whether unions’ reliance on card check
campaigns would violate the NLRA by interfering with free employee choice on
union representation issues. By citing just three NLRB sources of social science
statistics on employee decision making 14 and failing to examine new evidence to
justify the reversal, the Board exposed itself to accusations of erroneousness and
politicization.
In this Note, I argue that in order to recall the era of scientifically supported
adjudications, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s unique needs by
authorizing an economic research unit to generate policy analyses, and by
approving a cross-disciplinary Board to evaluate these analyses. By expanding the
pool of Board members to include lawyers and social scientists, Congress may
succeed in cultivating a spirit of cooperation across specializations while utilizing
the members’ combined expertise in legal rights issues and social science statistics.
In turn, this will empower the Board to promulgate more rational, less volatile
labor policy.
In Part II, I examine the NLRB’s reliance on amicus briefs for expert
evidence. Part II explains the means of gathering evidence in Board adjudications,
the rules for applying evidence in administrative agencies, and standards for
evaluating evidence under Daubert precedent. In Part III and Part IV, I evaluate
the Board’s decision making before and after the DER was disbanded through a
brief case study of the card recognition cases. After defining a card recognition
campaign and detailing the recognition-bar challenge, Part IV discusses the use of
social science statistics and critiques the quality and quantity of data in three recent

7. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1392.
8. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems
with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2019 (2009).
9. James A. Gross, Economics, Politics, and the Law: The NLRB’s Division of Economic Research,
1935–1940, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 347 (1970).
10. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
14. These sources were a former chairman, an operation summary, and an annual report. See
id. at 439; id. at 439 n.25; id. at 440 n.26.
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card recognition cases. Finally, in Part V and Part VI, I describe my proposal and
conclusion on restoring the accuracy and legitimacy of the Board by incorporating
scientific evidence into its adjudications.
II. THE NLRB’S RELIANCE ON AMICUS BRIEFS FOR EXPERT EVIDENCE
A. Evidence Gathering in NLRB Adjudications
Unlike other federal regulatory agencies, the Board creates policy by deciding
disputes, not writing regulations.15 Because the Board no longer employs any
experts to research labor realities 16 or enjoys independent access to social science
studies,17 it must rely on appellate-level party and amicus case briefs for social
science evidence to inform its conclusions on weighty national issues.18
Without the expertise to evaluate data independently, Board members could
theoretically delegate the task of gathering and testing this evidence to the factfinding phase of the ALJ proceeding, relying on the parties to subject it to
rebuttal, counterevidence, and cross-examination. However, the ALJ-level option
is ill-suited to meeting the Board members’ need for expensive economic
evidence.
During NLRB decisions, ALJs behave like trial courts enforcing the Board’s
policies, while members behave like appellate courts evaluating its precedent.
Once the parties file appeals, the Board can choose to revisit the policies or merely
to review the parties’ appeals.19 Thus, when prosecuting multiple cases that
involve similar issues, the General Counsel cannot predict which case will become
the vehicle for reexamining the regulations. Considering the cost of generating
specialized evidence, the General Counsel lacks the resources to incorporate
statistics assessing the NLRB’s existing policy into every labor case.
Instead of relying on trials, the Board has bridged the gap by admitting
appellate briefs as social science evidence. Given the members’ special
qualifications on thorny legal issues, most analysts agree that “greater laxity may be
permitted in a court which adjudicates both on the law and on the fact,”20
allowing the Board to admit expert input without observing the formalistic
procedural requirements of rules of evidence, including the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE).21 Accordingly, the Board can rely on evidence “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or

15. Myron Roomkin & Roger L. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A
Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1441, 1462–63 n.89 (1977).
16. See Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See NAT’L LABOR. REL. BD., supra note 1, at 35–36.
20. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 911 (5th ed. 2010).
21. Id. at 912.
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inferences upon the subject,” 22 even if the evidence would be inadmissible in a
federal court case under the FRE.23
Because the absence of clear-cut rules can raise the risk of arbitrariness or
bias, this discretionary standard increases the importance of assessing when and
how the NLRB engages evidence. In Dana II, the Board admitted four party
briefs, twenty-four amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, but cited three sources of
social science statistics, all from within the NLRB; 24 in Dana III, the Board
admitted three party briefs, fourteen amicus briefs, and two reply briefs, but cited
no social science statistics.25 While some imagine the NLRB encounters a “gaping
hole” in relevant research,26 the admission/citation imbalance may challenge this
conjecture and create an inference that when the Board members lack the
expertise to evaluate scientific evidence, increasing the amount of evidence is
unlikely to increase its utility.
Recognizing the disadvantages of relying on amici, certain scholars suggest
that Congress should authorize a social science unit that evokes the Board’s “early
days.” 27 However, the NLRB is different from similar agencies that employ
economists for specialized analysis. First, Congress’s standard criteria for qualified
Board members have evolved to limit the ability of academics without industrial
workplace experience to influence national policy. Second, the Board’s
adjudicatory body only requires economic research on specific appellate issues, not
general policy inquiries. Third, the Board receives a substantial quantity of expert
evidence from amicus briefs, not internal sources. Thus, I argue that assuming
Congress authorizes a social science unit, it should maximize the Board members’
odds of applying science properly by expanding the pool of members to include
social scientists.
B. Evidentiary Rules for Administrative Agencies
Given federal agencies’ great discretion on many evidentiary matters, it is
essential that adjudicators have the expertise to evaluate scientific evidence. Under

22. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
23. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 912.
24. Dana Corp. (Dana II), 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). For a list of links to all briefs in Dana II,
see Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-RD-001976 (last
visited Dec. 20, 2011) (discussed in detail in infra Part IV). While the website lists twenty-five amicus
briefs, this appears to be an error because the Brief of International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Amicus American
Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations is listed twice.
25. Dana Corp. (Dana III ) , 356 N.L.R.B. 49 (2010). For a list of links to all briefs in Dana III,
which are listed under Lamons Gasket Co. because the original employer withdrew its request for
review, see Lamons Gasket Co. Invitation to File Briefs, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov
/node/384 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (discussed in detail in infra Part IV).
26. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check Campaigns: Results of a
Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 160 (2009).
27. Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 15, at 1459–60 n.79.
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the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are not subject to the FRE.28 Instead,
the ALJ may receive “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence . . . , but the agency as a
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence.”29 Indeed, the NLRB’s rules require the Board to obey the
FRE only “so far as practicable.”30
To justify this distinction, analysts observe that evidentiary rules for judicial
trials are designed with juries in mind. Accordingly, these evidentiary rules assume
that triers of fact are: (1) separate from judges who adjudicate the issue of
admissibility, (2) lacking in knowledge on legal psychology or technical reliability,
(3) susceptible to error in assessing probative value, (4) inclined to emotionality,
and (5) hence restrainable only by restricted exposure to prejudicial evidence.31
By contrast, agencies entrust fact-finding to professionals, not laypeople.32
(For example, the NLRB employs mostly labor lawyers as Board members.33)
Considering their “specialized expertise in the subject matter,” they do not share
the aforementioned five characteristics of juries: separation of responsibility,
inexperience on topic, susceptibility to error, inclination toward emotionality, and
restraint through lack of exposure. Consequently, they are trusted to examine the
evidence without strong FRE safeguards against misuse.34
Because an agency adjudicator “is equally exposed to evidence whether he
admits it or excludes it,” reviewing courts reason that rigorous exclusionary rules
for agency proceedings make little sense.35 Given the adjudicator’s presumptive
competence to disregard or discount the information found inadmissible or
inapplicable, courts see little harm in letting agencies receive disputed evidence. By
contrast, they discern great danger in eliminating “that which is competent and
relevant by mechanistic application” of exclusionary rules.36
Accordingly, courts advocate a highly “critical view of exclusionary rulings by
administrative agencies”37 and admonish that exclusions “may well result” in due
process reversals.38 Simply put, they “strongly advise administrative law judges: if
in doubt, let it in.”39 By effectively eliminating the procedural protections against
admitting incompetent evidence, these cases increase the importance of evaluating
the evidence—without affording an alternative for agencies that lack the requisite
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Cir. 1999).
36.
37.
38.
39.

PIERCE, supra note 20, at 909.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2010).
29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (2010).
PIERCE, supra note 20, at 910–11.
Id. at 912.
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019.
PIERCE, supra note 20, at 911.
U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 187 F.3d 384, 388 (4th
Multi-Med. Convalescent & Nursing Ctr. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 978.
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scientific expertise to resolve technical ambiguities.
C. The Daubert Standard for Evaluating Evidence
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court used the
assumption of professional adjudicator expertise to establish a highly relaxed
standard for assessing scientific evidence in the absence of a jury.40 Specifically,
Daubert cited FRE 703, which permits experts to base their opinion testimony on
evidence “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,”41 even if that evidence would
itself be inadmissible. The “spirit of Daubert” 42 renders FRE 703 relevant to
advising administrative agencies.43
When analyzing the scientific validity of specialized evidence, the Supreme
Court admonished trial courts to assess two factors: reliability and relevance.44 To
do so, the Supreme Court envisioned a “flexible” inquiry 45 and identified five
generally relevant issues: (1) Can (and has) the theory or technique been tested? (2)
Has it been subjected to peer review/publication? (3) What is the known or
potential error rate? (4) Does it have standards of operation? How are they being
maintained? and (5) Does it enjoy “general acceptance”? 46
Applying these principles to current NLRB cases may pose two problems.
First, vigorous cross-examination and strong counterevidence “are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”47 However,
evidence introduced in amicus briefs is never subject to cross-examination.
Additionally, briefs filed last or simultaneously are unlikely to receive a response.
As a result, amicus briefs can always avoid cross-examination and often avoid
rebuttal.
Second, Daubert requires the agency’s evidentiary inquiries to “focus . . .
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.”48 However, critics might infer that Board members lacking the expertise
to focus on social science principles and methodology have no choice but to focus
on their conclusions. NLRB “flip-flops” that apparently result from ideological
voting may challenge the perception of specialized Board expertise and call the
agency’s perceived legitimacy into question.49

40. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. Id. at 597.
42. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 912.
43. Id.
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
45. Id. at 594.
46. Id. at 593–94.
47. Id. at 596.
48. Id. at 595.
49. Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 707, 760 (2006).
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Considering the complexity of the NLRA and the sophistication of the
NLRB’s policy problems, the Board has encountered an array of occasions for
social science statistics. However, without a social science staff, the NLRB often
relies on agency experience, not scientific evidence. When the Board does attempt
to incorporate specialized input, it finds itself “poorly equipped to evaluate it.”50
Thus, the NLRB has filled the gap by relying on data from party/amicus briefs.
In relying on amici, the agency encounters two important critiques.
Proponents of social science scholarship are wary of basing NLRB decisions on
“untested suppositions” about human behavior.51 Instead, they urge the Board to
use “the best available data”52 to conduct empirical studies, and employ expert
theory and research to assess the assumptions of cause and effect in regulated
labor processes.53 This way the NLRB could determine the impact of potential
workplace policies,54 especially in areas that exceed the Board members’
experiences.
Second, opponents of amici are skeptical of NLRB decisions relying on
briefs that implicate factual issues. Since the Board usually solicits amicus briefs on
appeal, they possess the potential to derail a litigation. Because amicus briefs can
introduce factual information without obeying the rules of evidence or receiving
vigorous cross-examination, the NLRB cannot rely on parties’ adverse interests to
keep them honest. Instead, it must evaluate evidence independently—a challenge
for lay Board members in hypertechnical cases.
III. DECIONMAKING UNDER DER
In the 1930s, the Board’s original membership was almost exclusively
composed of nonpartisan government employees and academics.55 Further, the
NLRB’s employees included a Division of Economic Research (DER), a staff of
economists that developed policy analyses to assist the Board in deciding labor
disputes.56 By relying on social science statistics from both the economists from
the DER and an assortment of parties, agencies, and academics from outside the
division, this early Board enriched its understanding of complex labor questions,
established a practice of considering diverse perspectives, and acknowledged the
importance of rigorously assessing the socioeconomic impact of labor policy.
To aid the Board in producing good policy, DER economists performed
independent research and wrote detailed reports that provided an economic50. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
51. JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 265
(1981).
52. Derek C. Bok, Foreword to JULIUS G. GETMAN, ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS xi, xii (1976).
53. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
54. Gross, supra note 9, at 345.
55. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1367.
56. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
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history explanation for pressing labor problems. After the NLRB’s General
Counsel had introduced these reports into evidence, they appeared in opinions
from NLRB Board members and reviewing appellate justices, often without
opposition.57 When parties did object to general DER statistics, they argued the
data was immaterial, unverified hearsay “of no evidentiary value.”58 Rejecting this
reasoning, the Eighth Circuit noted the well-settled “propriety of introducing in
evidence economic data . . . obtained from governmental or other authoritative
sources.”59
For example, in NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., the General Counsel charged a
bituminous coal company with discharging two employees for joining a union,
thereby affecting interstate commerce and violating NLRA § 8(1).60 When the
company denied operating a business that affected interstate commerce, the
opinion cited a DER bulletin entitled The Effect of Labor Relations in the Bituminous
Coal Industry upon Interstate Commerce, which specifically stated that “production is
customarily not undertaken until orders are received and a supply of cars [for
interstate coal shipments is] assured.”61
Likewise, in H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, the General Counsel charged an
employer that reached a unionized workplace agreement but declined to sign a
contract with refusing to bargain in violation of sections 8(1) and 8(5) of the
NLRA.62 To explain why failure to sign a contract necessarily violated the duty to
bargain and undercut the NLRA’s express aims, the opinion cited a DER bulletin
entitled Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, which itemized the growth
and extent of signed trade agreements and inferred they serve “both as recognition
of the union with which the agreement is reached and as a permanent memorial of
its terms.”63
In addition to citing DER studies, NLRB Board members and reviewing
appellate justices also enriched their analyses by supporting substantive statements
with non-DER sources. In Crowe, the opinion demonstrated the respondent’s
effect on interstate commerce by citing the parties’ agreed statement of facts,
which described the transactions for one representative year. The statement’s
57. See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 61 S. Ct. 320, 323 (1941) (citation to DER by Board);
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n, 300 U.S. 515, 545 n.4 (1937) (citation to DER by National Mediation
Board, which covers workplace disputes under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152).
58. NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 634 (8th Cir. 1939).
59. Id. at 634 n.1 (citing NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267 n.2 (1938); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 n.8 (1937); Virginian, 300 U.S. at 545–46 nn.4–5).
60. Id. at 633.
61. Id. at 635 (citing Dep’t of Econ. Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 2 (1938)).
62. Heinz, 61 S. Ct. at 323.
63. Id. at 324 n.1. The footnote reads, in part: “Concerning the growth and extent of signed
trade agreements, see National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic Research Bull. No. 4,
Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, pp. 213–236, 49–209; U.S. Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Five Years of Collective Bargaining, pp. 5–7; Saposs and Gamm, Rapid
Increase in Contracts, 4 Labor Relations Reporter No. 15, p. 6.” Id.
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statistics showed, for example, that 98,583.32 tons of respondent’s coal (or 36.8
percent of total production) had entered interstate commerce or been used to
enable interstate commerce to function.64
Similarly, the Heinz opinion used agency statistics and scholarly studies to
illustrate the importance of written agreements to peaceful workplaces.
Specifically, sources showed that: (1) the number of signed trade contracts had
grown over time,65 (2) written contracts served as a recognition of the union and a
record of the terms,66 (3) employers often declined to sign written contracts in
order to frustrate the process of bargaining,67 and (4) unlike unilateral policies,
signed labor contracts were considered “effective instrument[s] of stabilizing labor
relations and preventing, through collective bargaining, strikes and industrial
strife.”68
By incorporating the DER’s rigorous labor policy research, the 1930s NLRB
led federal agencies by enriching its understanding of complex labor questions
with social science evidence. For example, in Virginian Railway Co. v. System
Federation, the National Mediation Board (NMB) borrowed information from a
DER bulletin entitled Governmental Protection of Labor’s Right to Organize to justify the
Railway Labor Act.69 When other agencies adopted the DER’s economic data,
they implicitly acknowledged its unique expertise on contentious labor questions
and lent an air of legitimacy to other Board opinions. By contrast, when they
stopped citing the NLRB’s specialized evidence, they signaled its irrelevance on
cutting-edge issues.
Further, the early NLRB established a practice of considering non-DER
perspectives with strong scientific support. For example, the Board used data to
show that employer interference with employee unionization often induced labor
unrest and impaired interstate commerce. In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB,

64. NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1939).
65. Heinz, 61 S. Ct. at 324 n.1. The footnote reads, in part: “Concerning the growth and
extent of signed trade agreements, see National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic
Research Bull. No. 4, Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, pp. 213–236, 49–209; U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Five Years of Collective Bargaining, pp. 5–7; Saposs and
Gamm, Rapid Increase in Contracts, 4 Labor Relations Reporter No. 15, p. 6.” Id.
66. Id. The footnote reads, in part: “Lewis L. Lorwin, The American Federation of Labor, p.
309; Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States, vol. II, pp. 179–181, 423, 424,
480; Perlman and Taft History of Labor in the United States, 1806–1932, vol. IV, pp. 9, 10; Paul
Mooney, Collective Bargaining, pp. 13, 14; Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., Labor and the
Government, p. 339.” Id.
67. Id. at 325 n.2. The footnote reads, in part: “Sumner H. Slichter, Annals of the American
Academy (March, 1935), pp. 110–120; R. R. R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes, p. 224.” Id.
68. Id. at 325 n.3. The footnote reads: “Carroll R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American
Industry (Rev. ed. 1938), pp. 936, 937; Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 347; George G. Groat, An
Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America, 2d Ed.1926, pp. 337–339, 341, 345, 346;
First Annual Report, National Mediation Board, pp. 1–2.” Id.
69. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n, 300 U.S. 515, 545–46 nn.4–5 (1937) (citing Dep’t of Econ.
Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 1 (1936)).
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it cited an eighteen-month Department of Labor (DOL) study that blamed antiunion activities for eight of fifteen canning-industry work stoppages, which
affected 7,484 employees.70 In Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, it cited another
eighteen-month DOL study that blamed anti-union activities for ninety-four
textile-industry work stoppages affecting 290,154 employees and costing the
industry 3,958,891 man-days of idleness.71
Additionally, the 1930s NLRB engaged the evidence by scrutinizing whether
statistics actually supported the party briefs’ points. Occasionally, the Board
repurposed one party’s studies to support another party’s statements. For
example, in NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., the Board cited the defendant’s
data on plant productivity to disprove its claims of declines in production and
suggest a proscribed motive for partially closing.72 Similarly, in Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. NLRB, the court cited a company’s data on seasonal hiring to show its
unjustified departure from standard practice and thus to support the NLRB’s
inference of anti-union animus for failing to rehire.73
In 1939, however, a congressional committee confiscated the DER’s
economic files and branded the Board’s Chief Economist a Communist.74 In
1940, Congress “unceremoniously” banned the NLRB from employing economic
experts.75 By attacking the DER’s political ideology (not the unit’s scientific
methodology), Congress implied that some perspectives are simply forbidden,
regardless of whether they receive scientific support. Although the specific
political attack that motivated this ban was discredited and faded from America’s
political culture, the ban itself persists in affecting NLRB processes.
Finally, the early NLRB recognized the importance of studying social science
when setting labor policy. In keeping with the spirit of the NLRA, whose
proponents feared that partisan appointees were probably partial to specific sides
and possibly driven by future reemployment with certain interests,76 presidents
nominated scholars and nonpartisan government workers “nearly exclusively.”77
When presidents assumed that career academics were uniquely qualified and
inherently impartial, they implied that social science expertise was integral to
setting labor policy. However, when presidents abandoned this nomination
tradition, they intimated that social science expertise was secondary to partisan

70. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 462–63 (1938).
71. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1938) (citing to “Board
Exhibit No. 16, under the title ‘Strikes and lockouts in the Cotton Textile Industry in 1934, and in
January to July, inclusive, 1935, by Major Issues Involved’”).
72. NLRB v. Nat’l Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652, 657–58 (9th Cir. 1939).
73. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1939).
74. Stryker, supra note 5, at 350; 25.6 NLRB, RECORDS RELATING TO THE SMITH
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF THE NLRB (1934 –1941).
75. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344; 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011).
76. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1368, 1368 n.25.
77. Id. at 1367.
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industry experience—an important impediment to achieving legitimacy.
IV. DECISIONMAKING AFTER DER: AN NLRB CASE STUDY
A. Card Recognition Campaigns
The NLRB is currently confronting a high-stakes debate: whether the NLRA
should protect a union organizing process that excludes an official Board election
and allows recognition of a union by a majority sign-up process. By conducting a
brief case study of card recognition cases, I argue that the disbanding of the DER
and the restaffing of the Board have undermined the accuracy and legitimacy of
difficult NLRB decisions. First, I define a card recognition campaign and detail the
recognition-bar challenge. Next, I discuss the use of social science statistics and
critique the quality and quantity of data in three recent card recognition cases.
Finally, I describe my proposal and conclusion on restoring the accuracy and
legitimacy of the Board by incorporating scientific evidence into its adjudications.
Traditionally, a union would organize a workplace by collecting authorization
cards from employees who supported union representation. Once the union had
cards from a third of the workplace’s eligible employees, it would submit these
cards to the NLRB and request a secret ballot election. If the union won the
election by majority vote, the employer would have to recognize the union and
engage in good faith bargaining. In order to give the union a chance to negotiate
its initial bargaining agreement, the NLRB would apply an unrebuttable
presumption that the union represented a majority of the employees until the
expiration of a reasonable waiting period.78 This would protect the winning union
from rival unions.
Today, a union that collects valid cards from a majority of the employees at a
site typically does not request an official NLRB election. Instead, it asks the
employer for voluntary recognition in the form of a neutrality agreement or “card
check.” Studies show that more employees support unions during card check
campaigns than secret ballot elections.79 Accordingly, some employers state that
ballots best reflect the preferences of employees and argue that unions behave
coercively during the organizing drives preceding the card check campaigns.80
Conversely, some unions state that cards best reflect the preferences of employees
and argue that employers behave coercively between the card check campaigns
and the secret ballot elections.81
Both proponents and opponents of card recognition campaigns can cite
social science that supports their standpoint. On one hand, some studies show
78. Michael E. Aleo, Card Check Recognition: The Ongoing Legal and Legislative Battle 2–3 (bepress
Legal Series, Working Paper No. 957, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/957.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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that employers opposing unions have considerably more opportunities for
dissuading their employees from voting for unions and often commit poorly
remedied unfair labor practices against unions between demand and election.82
However, other sources suggest that unions gathering cards take advantage of
workers’ wishes to “avoid offending the person who asks them to sign, often a
fellow worker, or simply to get the person off their back.”83 Further, employees
who sign cards might simply change their minds.84
In other words, the current legal contest over whether or when a union
should be able to receive recognition with a card recognition majority instead of a
secret ballot election hinges on several empirical questions, for example: Are cards
or elections more reliable indicators of employee preferences? Are unions more
likely to misinform or coerce the employees into submitting cards supporting the
representation? Or are employers more likely to misinform or coerce the
employees who submitted cards supporting the representation into voting against
unionization?
Although the Board recognizes cards as bases for measuring employee
support for unionization, it expresses a long-standing preference for secret ballot
elections.85 However, the labor community continues to debate the question of
whether this preference is based on sound social science and reflects a practical
public policy. Given the evidence that card recognition campaigns are easier for
unions to organize and harder for employers to stop, the stakes are high for
industries, employers, and employees.
B. The Recognition-Bar Challenge
Recently, the Board was forced to confront these hot topic questions head
on. In Dana I, an automotive workers’ union successfully conducted a card check
campaign and convinced the employer to confer voluntary recognition by signing
a standard neutrality agreement.86 Under the recognition-bar doctrine, a union that
secures good faith employer support on basis of demonstrated majority status can
receive a three-year reprieve from official Board elections.87 In Dana I, this
prevented a rival labor union from seeking to represent the same bargaining unit.88
In order to defeat the recognition-bar doctrine, the rival union complained
that the acting union lacked the status of majority bargaining representative and
could not enter a neutrality agreement on behalf of Dana’s employees. Generally,

82. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1784 (1983).
83. NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir. 1983).
84. Alliant Foodservice, 335 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (2001).
85. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
86. Dana Corp. (Dana I), JD-24-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005).
87. Aleo, supra note 78, at 2–3.
88. Dana I, JD-24-05 at 3.
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the ALJ is charged with enforcing agency policy, while the Board is capable of
evaluating its desirability.89 Accordingly, the Dana I ALJ used a mere ten pages to
apply the recognition-bar doctrine and dismiss the complaint.90 Despite the
quantity and complexity of issues that impact the recognition-bar discussion, the
ALJ cited no social science statistics and made no mention of whether it
represented sound policy.
On appeal from Dana I, the reviewing Board in Dana II reframed the issue
from descriptive (whether the parties had obeyed the recognition-bar doctrine) to
normative (whether the doctrine should exist at all). To answer the legal question
of whether the recognition-bar doctrine is compatible with statute and
commendable as policy, the Board addressed the factual question of whether card
check elections are more prone than secret ballot elections to coercion and
manipulation.91 As a result, the NLRB admitted four party briefs, twenty-four
amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, many of which emphasized the social science
evidence and couched their challenges in data analysis terms.92
Using this evidence, the Board reconsidered the balance between two
competing interests: protecting employee preference and promoting stable
bargaining. Upon holding the recognition-bar doctrine to undervalue the
employees’ statutory right to choose their representation through official NLRB
elections, the Board lowered the recognition bar and modified the restrictions on
rival unions’ power to challenge the representativeness of voluntarily recognized
unions.93
Three years later, the Board used Rite Aid Store #6473 to solicit amicus briefs
regarding “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers under Dana
[II]”; 94 several months later, it reaffirmed the ALJ’s dismissal in Dana I.95 The
following year, the Board overturned Dana II and reinstated the recognition bar.96
Considering the number of times the agency has changed its policy in just the last
six years, this development underscores the need for reliable statistics to justify the
NLRB’s decisions.

89. See NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., supra note 1, at 35–36.
90. Dana I, JD-24-05 at 3.
91. Dana Corp. (Dana II), 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007).
92. Id. at 434 n.2; Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/case
/08-rd-001976 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
93. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434.
94. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
95. Dana Corp. (Dana III ) , 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Dec. 6, 2010).
96. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov
/link/document.aspx/09031d458060afd7. In Lamons, the Board overruled the substantive conclusion
of Dana II. As my case study of the Dana decisions only examines the Board’s use of scientific
evidence without judging its ultimate conclusions, I will not discuss Lamons.
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C. Dana II’s Amicus Evidence
1. Citations to Social Science Statistics
To answer the legal/normative question of whether card recognition
campaigns should receive NLRA protection, Dana II assessed the
factual/empirical question of whether card recognition campaigns are inherently
less reliable than official NLRB elections.97 Despite admitting twenty-four amicus
briefs that represented a variety of interests,98 the Board relied largely on three
NLRB sources: a former chairman,99 an operational summary,100 and an annual
report.101
First, the Board cited a 1962 presentation by Frank McCulloch, who served
as chairman from 1961 to 1970 102—a source mentioned in “several” Dana II
briefs103 and other court opinions.104 While Dana II failed to specify McCulloch’s
strategy for obtaining the statistics he cited, the speech’s transcript suggests that
McCulloch had examined 202 elections: fifty-eight with recognition rates105 of
thirty to fifty percent, eighty-seven with fifty to seventy percent, and fifty-seven
with over seventy percent.106
The statistics showed a “significant disparity” between card recognition rates
and official election results: Unions with fifty to seventy percent recognition won
only forty-eight percent of elections, and unions with over seventy percent
recognition won only seventy-four percent of elections.107 (For fifty to seventy
percent recognition, “[t]he study itself gives the figure fifty-two percent, but this is
evidently an arithmetical error, since the study reports that the union won fortytwo out of eighty-seven elections, which is forty eight percent.”108)
97. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439.
98. Dana II lists the amici who oppose the recognition-bar doctrine: (1) twenty-one
Republican representatives; (2) federal and state chambers of commerce; (3) employer industry
associations; (4) contract security companies; (5) anti-union advocacy organizations; and (6)
labor/employment attorneys. 351 N.L.R.B. at 435 n.8. Additionally, Dana II lists the amici who
support the recognition-bar doctrine: (1) forty-eight Democratic congressmen; (2) companies; (3)
unions; (4) labor advocacy organizations; and (5) professors. Id. at 436 n.9.
99. Id. at 439.
100. Id. at 439 n.25.
101. Id. at 440 n.26.
102. Board Members Since 1935, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us
/overview/board/board_members_since_1935.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
103. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439.
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir. 1983); Retail, Wholesale,
& Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.,
386 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Johnnie’s Poultry, 344 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1965);
Cnty. of Du Page v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 231 Ill. 2d 593, 625 (2008).
105. The percentage of employees who submitted cards supporting the union.
106. Frank McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: Or Law in Action, 1962 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA
SECTION OF LAB. REL. LAW 14, 17 (1962).
107. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439 (citing McCulloch, supra note 106, at 17).
108. Village IX, 723 F.2d at 1371; accord Du Page, 231 Ill. 2d at 625.
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Next, the Board cited two NLRB sources. In 2007, the General Counsel
released an operational summary memorandum for fiscal year 2006, which
revealed that once the NLRB received an election petition, the median delay was
thirty-nine days. In fact, 94.2 percent of elections occurred within fifty-six days.109
The year before, the NLRB gave an annual report for fiscal year 2005, which only
showed an objection rate110 of five percent.111
Finally, the Board cited an article by James Brudney, which surveyed several
dozen social science studies (and even a Dana II brief) on card-recognition issues,
many published within the last ten years.112 However, it did not utilize Brudney’s
article to communicate a labor policy argument or convey an expert
insight/evidence. Instead, it used Brudney simply to supply a list of voluntaryrecognition objectives “that will remain unaffected by our decision today.” 113
2. Use of Social Science Statistics
Surprisingly, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed
whether McCulloch’s statistics constituted good science. That is, neither opinion
checked the study for compliance with Daubert’s evidentiary benchmark for
testing, peer review, error rate, operational standards, and general acceptance.
Instead, they confined their inquiry to questioning its relevance to determining the
significance of receiving card recognition.
Specifically, the majority argued that elections represent an instantaneous
snapshot of employee preference.114 However, recognition cards are regularly
collected over protracted periods (e.g., over a year in one union drive), during
which time “employees can and do change their minds.”115 Because these cards
merely provide a basis for conducting an election, the reasons for questioning
their reliability “become moot once an election is held.”116
By contrast, the dissent insisted the study had “prove[d] nothing” about
whether cards or elections are more reliable. This is because the disparity could
“just as easily” have resulted from employer coercion during election campaigns as
109. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439 n.25 (citing Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB,
Memorandum GC 07-03 Revised, Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2006) (2007)).
110. The percentage of elections in which the losing party filed an objection to the winner’s
campaign manner and asked the NLRB to invalidate the outcome.
111. Id. at 440 n.26 (citing 70 NLRB Ann. Rep. 130 (2005)).
112. Id. at 442 n.34 (citing James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832–41 (2005)). The brief in question is Brief
for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan as Amicus Curiae, Dana Corp. (Dana II ), 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007)
(No. 8-RD-1976) (supporting voluntary recognition). See Brudney, supra, at 886 n.54.
113. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 442.
114. Id. at 439.
115. Id. at n.23 (citing Alliant Foodservice, 335 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (2001), where sixteen
employees who signed cards for one union later signed cards for another union).
116. Id. at n.24 (citing Ne. Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 248 (1975), which states that “it is the
election, not the showing of interest, which decides” the issue of representation).
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union coercion during card collections. Depending on who coerced whom, the
cards (not the votes) may “truly [have] reflected the employees’ free choice.”117
Similarly, the opinions never questioned the admissibility or reliability of
internal NLRB evidence and concentrated their arguments on examining its
applications. Since 94.2 percent of elections occur within three months of the
filing of the election petition, the majority argued that providing orderly processes
for gauging electoral fairness may only cause a “substantial delay in a small
minority” of union drives.118 Because ninety-five percent of elections lack
objections, the statistics belie suggestions that anti-union employers enjoy “a onesided advantage” which allows them to exert pressure on employees throughout
an election campaign.119
Without disputing the 94.2 percent figure, the dissent declared the delay
unacceptable because union status can remain unresolved for three months after
voluntary recognition and because objections may cause the delay to snowball.120
Likewise, without disputing the five percent figure, the dissent maintained that
“[t]o the extent the majority is suggesting that employer coercion is rare in election
campaigns, the majority’s statistics do not account for situations in which
employer conduct was not known to the union or in which the union, for
whatever reason, chose not to file objections.”121
Finally, the opinions never probed the Brudney survey article for
admissibility or relevance. Interestingly, Brudney argued that “an array of findings
and studies indicate that the NLRB elections regime regularly tolerates,
encourages, and effectively promotes coercive conditions that preclude the
attainment of employee free choice,” 122 which directly challenges the majority
preference for NLRB elections.123
Without scrutinizing these studies or engaging these arguments, the majority
utilized Brudney merely to supply the various reasons for voluntary recognition
“that will remain unaffected by our decision today.” 124 By contrast, the dissent
used the article to support a substantive factual statement: that “employer antiunion conduct, and attendant delays, can undermine union support during lengthy
election campaigns.” 125

117. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result).
118. Id. at 439 n.25 (citing Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Memorandum GC 07-03
Revised, Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2006) (2007)).
119. Id. at 440 n.26 (citing 70 NLRB Ann. Rep. 130 (2005)).
120. Id. at 447 n.15 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result).
121. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result).
122. Brudney, supra note 112, at 819.
123. See Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434.
124. Id. at 442 (citing Brudney, supra note 112, at 832–41).
125. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result) (citing
Brudney, supra note 112, at 824).
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D. Rite Aid’s Amicus Evidence
In Rite Aid, the Board switched gears on card-check campaigns. In granting
the request to review Dana II’s modification of recognition-bar protection, Rite
Aid refrained from reaching the merits or citing any statistics without “giving any
interested party any opportunity to present any evidence” on whether Dana II was
working to effectuate the employees’ choices regarding union representation.126
Thus, it opted to solicit amicus briefs in order to “consider the actual experience
of employees, unions, and employers under Dana Corp., before arriving at any
conclusions.” 127
By contrast, the concurrence and dissent both cited the NLRB’s election
statistics as compiled by its General Counsel. These statistics showed an official
election rate of five percent and a union rejection rate of one percent. Specifically,
as of June 1, 2010, the NLRB received some 1,111 notices of voluntary
recognition and fifty-four petitions for traditional election. The voting employees
refused the union fifteen times, a number that included two elections that chose a
petitioning union over the recognized union.128
Again, neither opinion disputed the General Counsel’s data as inadmissible
or unreliable. Instead, they disagreed on whether it showed that Dana II was doing
its job. The concurrence contended that since the rejection rate was just one
percent, Dana II served no “clear purpose” in ninety-nine percent of total cases.129
Further, the data had failed to capture those neutrality agreements that were not
signed as a result of the parties’ concerns about Dana II. Finally, it had failed to
address Dana II’s impact on collective bargaining after voluntary recognition.130
The dissent responded that since the data reported at least 1,111 post-Dana
II neutrality agreements (not including the ones with no posted notices), “[t]here
has been no apparent deterrent to voluntary recognition.” 131 Accordingly, the
Board had empirical evidence that Dana II protected the employees’ preferences
without discouraging either voluntary recognition or collective bargaining. By
contrast, it lacked “a scintilla of objective evidence to the contrary.”132
Finally, despite soliciting briefs on Dana II issues, and despite admitting three
party briefs, fourteen amicus briefs, and two reply briefs that represented a variety
of interests,133 the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent all failed to cite any
126. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2 n.5 (Liebman, concurring); id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting).
129. Id. at 2 n.5 (Liebman, concurring).
130. Id. at 2 (Liebman, concurring).
131. Id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting).
132. Id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting).
133. Invitations to File Briefs, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions
/invitations-file-briefs (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). The amici who oppose the recognition-bar doctrine
are (1) chambers of commerce; (2) employer industry associations; and (3) anti-union advocacy
organizations. The amici who support the recognition-bar doctrine are (1) congressmen; (2)
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social science statistics. Instead, they concentrated on comparing and contrasting
the Dana II issues to past precedent, particularly the prohibition on prehiring
agreements outside construction workplaces under Majestic Weaving Co. of New
York.134 In doing so, Board members reasoned “like lawyers balancing rights
rather than policy analysts studying social and economic regulatory problems.”135
F. Critique of Card Recognition Cases
1. Quality of Data
Throughout the card recognition cases, the Board fell short of engaging with
social science studies in the spirit of Daubert, which suggests that adjudicators who
evaluate specialized evidence should interrogate its testing, peer review, error rate,
operational standards, and general acceptance.136 Because labor conditions are
“rapidly changing,” 137 several legal scholars have updated McCulloch’s study with
more recent material.138 However, although his speech was forty-five years old at
the time of the Dana II decision, neither the majority nor the dissent ever raised
issues regarding its reliability. Likewise, both opinions accepted the General
Counsel’s statistics without addressing this issue.
Initially, the absence of Daubert analysis might not appear unduly alarming.
As a former NLRB chairman, McCulloch lacked incentive to falsify his findings to
favor either party. As a federal labor office, the General Counsel had expertise on
labor issues in general and NLRB proceedings in particular. As “several”
submitters cited the former chairman’s speech,139 it probably enjoyed a general
consensus of undisputed correctness. Consequently, analysts might assert that
Board members refrained from questioning its reliability simply because reliability
was not an issue.
However, critics should consider the studies’ two sources: the NLRB’s
former chairman and the NLRB’s General Counsel. Lacking internal expertise in
social science techniques,140 the Board must rely on briefs from parties to supply
specialized data141— and likely also to evaluate this data. Notwithstanding the
data’s true quality, the uniquely symbiotic relationship between the NLRB’s lawyer
companies; (3) unions; and (4) professors. It is worth noting that Dana III lists different amici. See
Dana Corp. (Dana III ) , 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (2010). This is likely because they had responded to a
March 30, 2006, request for briefs that occurred a year before Dana II. Accordingly, I analyze these
entities under Dana II.
134. Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).
135. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019.
136. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 924.
137. Christopher P. Yost & John H. Fanning, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required?, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 675, 677 (1989).
138. See infra Part II.
139. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 439 (2007).
140. Gross, supra note 9, at 344–45.
141. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2065.
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members as adjudicators, the NLRB’s General Counsel as researcher, and the
NLRB’s General Counsel as prosecutor may encourage the members to weigh
their opinions more heavily, letting older data from NLRB actors trump newer
data from outside entities.142
The Board is likeliest to encounter the issue of symbiosis when the beliefs of
members and researchers are aligned. That is, the Board is unlikely to complete a
rigorous Daubert analysis or conduct a resource-intensive review of specialized
opposing arguments when the adjudicators agree with the ideological implications
of the information’s conclusions. However, the parties and the public would
prefer the Board to articulate its reasons for accepting or rejecting these
arguments, especially when authors and adjudicators both serve a single agency
and support the same outcome.
The existence (or appearance) of undesirable incentives implicates two
issues: reliability and legitimacy. The assumption underlying the adversarial system
is that clashes between counterparties will expose the truth143—an assumption
critical to adjudicators lacking the technical knowledge to evaluate the evidence
without input from parties. If the Board develops patterns of weighing certain
viewpoints more heavily, this may cause the quality of evidence to decline, while
leaving the Board ill-equipped to detect the defects.
Commentators also claim that courts mainly derive their legitimacy and
authority from persuading the public by justifying their decisions.144 As agency
adjudicators are expressly encouraged to admit most evidence,145 the inquiry will
likely shift from admissibility to reliability. In this context, the absence of analysis
regarding the reliability of social science statistics may leave the Board’s decisions
unfounded, thus inviting an assumption of political/ideological motivations.
2. Quantity of Data
Although the Board members appeared to agree that McCulloch’s election
statistics were admissible and reliable, they disagreed on whether (and how) the
statistics were relevant to showing employee coercion by unions (or employers). In

142. Indeed, several scholarly studies have detected a nexus between the identities of the
parties and the reception of their pleadings. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749–50 (2000) (arguing that
courts usually cite large institutional players); S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review:
An Underdog Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 902, 903 (1978) (arguing that courts will cite some parties
(“upperdogs,” including businesses as well as federal, state, and local governments and their agents)
more frequently than others (“underdogs,” including labor unions, employees, minority group
members, aliens, and criminals)).
143. Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbolism in the Adversarial Process—
A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 748
(1995).
144. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2008).
145. Multi-Med. Convalescent & Nursing Ctr. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1977).
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order to illuminate these issues, they might have asked: (1) Fifty years later, does
McCulloch’s data still reflect labor realities? (2) How do employees receive
information regarding unions? and (3) How do employees make decisions on
whom to support? Ignoring this invitation to incorporate specialized evidence, the
opinions cited almost no social science studies to prove substantive points.
To explain this omission, one may assert the existence of “gaping hole[s]” in
empirical comparisons between the pressure on employees by unions and
employers.146 Since scientific studies often require investments of time and money,
the demand for data might exceed its supply from independent research
communities. Considering the NLRB’s express interest in ascertaining “the actual
experience of employees, unions, and employers,”147 and analyzing “what
members of the labor management community . . . have to say about this data and
its lessons,”148 critics might contend the Board is citing the best information
available.
However, Dana’s admission-to-citation imbalance calls the information hole
argument into question. In Dana II, the Board admitted four opening briefs and
four reply briefs from parties, as well as twenty-four briefs from amici. The briefs
cited thirty-nine different sources of social science statistics that appeared in
academic publications or agency reports from 2000 to 2010. These current
citations featured in three of four (seventy-five percent) of the party briefs, eleven
of twenty-four (forty-six percent) of the amicus briefs, and one of four (twentyfive percent) of the reply briefs—a range of zero to twelve citations per brief, and
an average of 1.6 current citations per brief.149 Nevertheless, the Dana II decision
utilized just three sources of social science statistics, all from within the NLRB.
Likewise, in Dana III, the Board admitted three party briefs, fourteen amicus
briefs, and two reply briefs. The briefs cited twenty-nine different sources of social
science statistics that appeared in academic publications or agency reports from
2000 to 2010. These figured in one of three (thirty-three percent) of the party
briefs, eight of fourteen (fifty-seven percent) of the amicus briefs, and one of two
(fifty percent) of the reply briefs—a range of zero to ten citations per brief, and
an average of 1.8 current citations per brief.150 However, despite the Board’s
stated interest in “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers,”151
Dana III used no social science statistics at all.
To explain this absence, critics should consider the shortage of rebuttal for
146. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 26, at 160.
147. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
148. Id. at 3 (Liebman, concurring).
149. Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-rd
-001976 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (Excel data sets that describe the briefs on file with author).
150. Invitations to File Briefs, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases
-decisions/invitations-file-briefs (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (Excel data sets that describe the briefs on
file with author).
151. Rite Aid, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 1.
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social science statistics from party and amicus briefs. In Dana II, just five152
current sources appeared in multiple entities’ briefs, with only three153 cited in
briefs that took opposite sides on recognition-bar issues. In Dana III, just seven154
appeared in multiple briefs—only two155 of them opposing. Given the overlap
between the sources cited in the Dana II briefs and the Dana III briefs, the
combined Dana briefing contributed only four 156 different current sources that
even potentially received an opponent’s rebuttal. This increased the difficulty of
evaluating them critically.
By reducing its citations to social science statistics, the Board might hope to
prevent lay members who lack a background in social science scholarship from
inadvertently placing authority in pseudoscience. However, this practice also
prevents the Board from accumulating experience/expertise in analyzing this type
of information. Further, it permits a somewhat dated study to frame the
discussion and dominate the debate, rather than sparking a dialogue that uses the
knowledge of the past and the present. As a result, the Board runs the risk of
rendering data irrelevant to reaching its decisions, thus raising an inference of
arbitrariness or incompetence.
V. PROPOSAL
Finally, I describe my proposal and conclusion on restoring the accuracy and
legitimacy of the Board by incorporating scientific evidence into its adjudications.
Because the amendment which prohibits the NLRB from employing any
economists arguably permits the employment of general social scientists,157 some
scholars suggest the agency should hire a social science unit to evaluate party

152. These five sources were cited in the briefs: JAROL P. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A
THOUSAND CUTS (2001), Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own
Obsolescence?, LAB. LAW. (2000), Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and
Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001), Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor
Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369 (2001), and Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen.
Counsel, to Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB (Dec. 5, 2003) (on file with author).
153. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, Hartley, supra
note 151, and Arthur F. Rosenfeld, supra note 152.
154. These sources were cited in the briefs: MANHEIM, supra note 152, Cohen, supra note 152,
Joel Dillard & Jennifer Dillard, Fetishing The Electoral Process: The National Labor Relations Board’s
Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 819 (2008), Eaton & Kriesky, supra
note 150, Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, New Survey Says Union Members Prefer Secret-Ballot Elections over
Card Check, DAILY LAB. REP., July 22, 2004, and Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The
Intensification of Employer Organizing, ECON. POL’Y INST., Briefing Paper No. 235 (2009).
155. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, and Fisk &
Malamud, supra note 8.
156. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, Fisk &
Malamud, supra note 8, Hartley, supra note 152, and Arthur F. Rosenfeld, supra note 152.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals . . . for economic analysis”).
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evidence and initiate independent investigations.158 However, the NLRB is
different from similar agencies that employ economists for scientific analysis.
Specifically, Congress’s standard criteria for qualified Board members have
evolved to limit the ability of academics without industrial workplace experience
to influence national policy. Second, the Board’s adjudicatory body only requires
economic research on specific appellate issues, not general policy inquiries. Third,
the Board receives a substantial quantity of expert evidence from amicus briefs,
not internal sources. Accordingly, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s
unique needs by authorizing an economic research unit to produce scientific
evidence and approving a cross-disciplinary Board to evaluate this evidence.
To this end, I argue that presidents and Congress should expand the Board
member pool to include social scientists. Originally, presidents accepted that
career academics were uniquely qualified and inherently impartial. However, since
the Eisenhower administration, presidents abandoned this nomination tradition in
order to limit the ability of academics without industrial workplace experience to
influence national policy. Despite initial protests, Congress approved these
appointments and apparently accepted the underlying arguments.
Specifically, when Eisenhower expanded the Board’s membership to include
political appointees, proponents suggested that partisans possessed: (1) an
expertise in real-world labor relations, (2) the integrity to render fair verdicts, and
(3) the ability to follow federal judges in rejecting their old roles as private parties
and assuming their new roles as representatives of the public interest.159 They also
alleged the impossibility of finding “anyone . . . entirely free” from allegedly
prejudicial experiences.160 By approving these appointments, Congress lent
credence to the arguments in their favor.
When Nixon nominated a career management lawyer named Edward B.
Miller, his supporters amplified the Eisenhower-era arguments to argue that since
private-sector experience yields practical expertise, Miller’s management
background was not a minus, but a plus. Instead, Congress’s true concern should
be the NLRB’s overwhelming inclusion of appointees from government and
academia.161 Again, Congress appeared to accept these arguments by approving
these appointments.
The Miller nomination marked a turning point in perceived acceptability of
partisan appointments. By reacting to antipartisan arguments with profound
indifference (not one senator voted against it), Congress exhibited “complete
acquiescence to the appointment of management partisans to the Labor Board.”162
Accordingly, Congress also implicitly acknowledged the concerns over permitting
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 15, at 1459.
Flynn, supra note 4, at 1372–74.
Id.
Id. at 1379–81.
Id. at 1382–83.
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government employees and academics who lacked industry experience to
influence labor policy. With the exception of Carter, the succeeding presidents
continued this practice.163
Supporting Miller’s appointment, one Senator expressed concern that the
Board “has had a deficiency by not having anyone on it who has had direct
practical experience in the field.”164 This rhetoric reflects an unflattering
assumption about academic experts. Specifically, it suggests that professional
researchers lack the industrial workplace expertise to understand their theories’
actual effects. By contrast, political appointees possess the practical life experience
to temper academics’ impact on national labor policy. This establishes an
inherently adversarial relationship between the contributions of the academics and
the competency of the agency.
If Congress were to reauthorize the DER, the tension between the lawyers
on the Board and the social scientists employed by it could undermine its ability to
use this evidence effectively. Assuming Congress’s attempts to ensure the
reconstituted DER’s independence by rendering it separate from the Board (much
like the NLRB’s General Counsel), it might hamper the economic unit’s
integration into existing Board processes by making it all too easy for members to
ignore its evidence and analyses.
By contrast, if Congress augments the Board’s membership with professional
academics, they may develop a dialogue between lawyers and researchers and
foster mutual assistance between law and science. At minimum, the Board
members trained in social science would be able to write majority, concurring, or
dissenting opinions assessing the Board’s evidentiary engagement, thereby forcing
the Board members trained in law to address the specialized evidence submitted.
Further, since current Board members serve a five-year term before rejoining
the ranks of attorneys for corporations and unions, their labor industry roots
could influence their ideologies (either because the interests of employability
might affect their opinions or because their side-specific ties might indicate their
preexisting labor philosophies). Accordingly, some argue that “because of their
bias, neither the Board as an institution nor the public will really reap the benefit
of the great practical expertise that union and management-side lawyers turned
Board members bring to the job . . . [because] their partisan ties will trump their
expertise every time.” 165
Assuming this argument has merit, the members’ partisan ties could equally
well trump the unit’s economic research. While Congress is unlikely to find a
perfectly impartial nominee, it may locate a professional researcher lacking a

163. Id. at 1393–94.
164. Id. at 1455 n.91 (quoting Miller testimony).
165. Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of
the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 478 (2000).

Assembled V1I4 4.9.2012 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

4/9/2012 10:25 AM

SUPPLYING THE NLRB WITH SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE

1281

connection to unions or corporations. Further, unlike an attorney Board member,
a scholarly Board member who evaluates technical evidence must adhere to
scientific community standards. Accordingly, his presence may counteract the
politicization of controversial labor questions by encouraging the NLRB to engage
the facts.Through persuading his colleagues to engage party evidence, a scholarly
Board member could promote the spirit of Daubert and push a thorough, rigorous
approach to justifying technical decisions. Indeed, since the original DER existed a
decade before Congress began approving any partisan Board members, a proposal
to evoke the Board’s early days should encompass both elements of early NLRB
adjudications: nonpartisan researchers and nonpartisan decisionmakers.
Further, the NLRB’s research needs are narrow in scope. For example, since
the Department of Labor (DOL) is charged with promulgating labor regulations,
its Division of Economic and Labor Research offers advice regarding the
relevance, application, and interpretation of current economic research to
international economic policy. Further, it fills DOL requests for research results
and economic analyses to facilitate the formulation of international economic
policies and programs.166 By contrast, the Board’s adjudicatory body only requires
economic research on specific issues relevant to adjudications, not general labor
policy.
Given the NLRB’s narrow interests, opponents of employing interagency
economists may argue that the DER’s exploratory research is incompatible with
the NLRB’s adjudicatory function. Without a background in law, academics might
expand their inquiries into questions not raised by real-world litigants, who may
prefer to leave these issues to legislatures or resolve them independently. Yet, if
NLRB adjudicators included a mix of lawyers and scholars, the agency could
utilize the attorneys’ unique expertise in limiting the deliberations to legally
relevant issues. To maximize these benefits of interdisciplinarity, the NLRB
should change its composition to include three labor lawyers and two social
scientists. (Ideally, the Board would implement this proposal upon reaching its
quorum of five acting members.) In setting the number of scientists at two of five,
the NLRB could include sufficient experts to permit a debate, thus preventing one
person from becoming the arbiter of real scientific truth. Simultaneously, it could
maintain the Board’s lawyer majority, thus reflecting its role of adjudicating legal
disputes.
Finally, the Board receives a substantial quantity of scientific evidence from
amicus briefs. However, while staffed exclusively by lawyers, the Board is illprepared to evaluate the quality of amicus evidence.167 Consequently, “the only
kind of expertise [the Board] possesses [is] the logical coherence of doctrine and

166. Division of Economic and Labor Research (ELR), DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov
/ilab/programs/otla/economic.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
167. Gross, supra note 9, at 346–47.
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an intuitive sense about whether particular rules generate productive or
unproductive litigation.” 168 This “type of expertise . . . is quite different from what
generally counts as administrative agency expertise,” that is, expertise in the
subject of the adjudication.169
Considering these characteristics of modern Board members, a social science
staff could enhance the NLRB by filling the expert evaluator void. If Congress did
nothing other than reauthorize the DER, it would create the problem of a single
party serving as both a source and an evaluator, and give this party an advantage
over external sources, only partially addressing the agency’s structural issues. By
contrast, if Congress also expanded the Board to include social scientists, it would
ensure that separate groups generate and evaluate specialized evidence.
On the one hand, a dominant interagency DER might reap the benefits of
economies of scale, allowing its economists to afford larger, more expensive
research. On the other, it may reduce competition for Board citations, thus
undermining accountability and encouraging complacency. By separating the
generators and evaluators of information, the NLRB could establish an incentive
for employees and amici to submit their very best research, thus increasing the
agency’s scientific relevance and improving its impartiality and legitimacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In defending agencies’ exemption from strict FRE standards for evaluating
expert evidence, scholars suggest that agency ALJs have: (1) extensive experience
and specialized expertise in specific subjects, and (2) political accountability for
policy choices regarding certain industries. Although the current NLRB lacks a
staff of social science experts, the Board still requires specialized expertise to
formulate labor policies that address real-world problems.170 To bridge this gap,
the Dana Boards admitted numerous briefs with social science statistics, but cited
very few of them. The pool of perspectives necessarily impacted the Board’s data
quality and quantity, and thus its deliberations and decisions.
Scholars have faulted the NLRB for its ignorance about the impact of its
decisions, its isolation from the policymaking in other areas of the law of the
workplace (including the policymaking of the Department of Labor and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission), and “the tendency of Board members,
who recently have been drawn almost entirely from the ranks of labor and
management attorneys, to reason like lawyers balancing rights rather than policy
analysts studying social and economic regulatory problems.” 171 Although many
agree the NLRB’s recent approach to evaluating scientific evidence is less than

168.
169.
170.
171.

Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2066.
Id.
Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019.
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perfect, they disagree on what the problems are—and how to fix them.
Accordingly, some state the NLRB should minimize its use of social science
to honor Congress’s intent in excluding economist employees while upholding
superior interests, such as legal realism and stare decisis. Others suggest the NLRB
should maximize its use of social science beyond simply employing social
scientists. Finally, some argue the NLRB should expand its role to encompass
both adjudication and rulemaking, thereby reducing its dependence on amicus
briefs altogether.
To support the role of science, I argue that bringing experts aboard will
enrich the analysis by offering an alternative to reasoning like lawyers. However,
assuming the NLRB then becomes more qualified to analyze specialized evidence,
it does not need to give this evidence dispositive weight. If the expert analysis
clashes with popular labor policy or existing market reality (for example, the
interest in maintaining stable rules), the Board could exercise its discretion to
minimize its impact.
To support the limits on economic experts, I argue the NLRB is entrusted
with balancing competing interests. Accordingly, the Board should create a culture
that incorporates specialized evidence without marginalizing alternative outlooks,
such as law and politics. By developing a reputation for justifying its decisions in
rational, empirical terms, the Board will increase its relevance and pave the way for
expanding into new policymaking avenues—perhaps even rulemaking.
When proposing novel solutions to pervasive social problems, some scholars
suggest that since the smaller government entities are more abundant, more
adaptable, and less likely to radically affect a large constituency, such “laboratories
of democracy” 172 serve as ideal test subjects. Thus, investigating a proposal for
improving the NLRB’s evidentiary policy could inspire a more universal debate
about whether amicus briefs are sufficient for courts to fill the social science gap
without sacrificing relevance and reliability. Ultimately, exploring these issues
could expand our ability to fashion a mutually beneficial relationship between law
and science.

172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (explaining the argument for
states as laboratories of democracy).
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